



SOMALIA Security and Political Awareness Report

7 July to 13 July 2014


Overview

The week saw continuing violence throughout. Al-Shabaab’s Ramadan offensive led to a continuing rise of attacks in Mogadishu with further assassinations and another strike on the Villa Somalia. Elsewhere Al-Shabaab launched further attacks on SNA and AMISOM strongholds, yet suffered from KDF airstrikes.

Politically the reporting period saw changes to the leadership of the National Security apparatus with 3 appointments made and changes to the leadership of NISA, the SNP and the appointment of a new minister of National Security, keeping in the vein of security there were also discussions over the justice system and the new Terrorism bill.

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
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NORTHERN REGION

Security Analysis

The northern region was significantly quieter than in previous weeks. The only incident to occur saw the defection of over 30 personnel from the Puntland Armed Forces. These defectors arrived in Laas Caanood where they were welcomed with open arms by the Somaliland Government. In discussion it turns out the defectors- and this group is not the only set to defect recently- did so due to clan reasons. The defectors were from the Dhulbahante sub-clan of the Darod and felt they were treated badly by the Majerten Darod leadership in Puntland.



Incident Map 1, Northern Region

1. Laas Caanood. 09.07 30+ Puntland troops defect to Somaliland.


Security Forecast

While this week saw no further fighting between Somaliland and Puntland, it is worth noting that Somaliland raised the spectre of war between Puntland and Somaliland with the announcement last week that Taleex is now the capital of the Haysimo region of Somaliland.

Given that Puntland has already vowed to liberate Sanaag, Sool and Ceyn from Somaliland and that this move by Somaliland represents the loss of territory claimed by Puntland it will further exacerbate tensions. The Government of Puntland will be unable to not act and retain support among elders and MPs.

While Puntland at present may not have enough troops to successfully respond to Somaliland, there are indications that additional revenues to fund an expansion and re-equipping of the Puntland Armed Forces is currently underway, with certain political developments that are covered later on.

We predict that while Puntland will carry out an offensive aiming to liberate what it sees as its territory, there are signs that this might be delayed until sufficient forces are prepared. However, the tensions currently present mean fighting could break out in the contested region at any point in the weeks ahead.



Forecast Map 2, Northern Region

CENTRAL REGION

Security Analysis

The Central Region saw an increased level of violence with 7 incidents reported. Clan tensions in Galgaduud and Hiraan both exploded, resulting in fighting in Deefow north of Belet Weyne that killed at least 10 and the assassination of a local government official in Cabudwaq.

The week saw an unusual incident, on 10.07 the MV Jamila a Kenyan cargo vessel became stranded due to technical difficulties in the village of Meyraaley. There have been reports that pirates were involved, but at present there is no information to support this. Instead it appears she suffered technical failure and limped into the nearest port. However, there is also a suggestion that she was engaged in illicit activities. The Jamila had unloaded in Mogadishu and supposedly was due next in Mombasa; however Meyraaley is north of Mogadishu which seems an odd way to get to Mombasa. Once in port local gangs are reported to have looted the vessel, before Al-Shabaab forces from Cadale arrived on the scene. Al-Shabaab is reported to have arrived in strength and abducted the crew- which included a number of Kenyans- and taken them to Cadale. There is a report that the SNA had liberated the Jamila from Meyraaley, but this is unconfirmed and given the lack of SNA presence in the area, seems unlikely.


The week also saw Al-Shabaab resurgent in Jowhar with a large IED disposed of by AMISOM EOD personnel on 12.07 and on 13.07 the Head of Tax Collection for Middle Shabelle narrowly survived an IED assassination attempt.

Security Forecast

The Central Region remains dominated by Al-Shabaab, with significant presence in Jalalaqsi and areas of Middle Shabelle and Galgaduud to the east. Continued control of the Region is an Al-Shabaab priority, loss of control would inhibit movement north and south and also the collection of "taxes" from the populace.


With control of the Central Region being a priority to Al-Shabaab, further fighting is a certainty. Although AMISOM and the SNA are attempting to expand their control, the rural areas remain under Al-Shabaab control with a resulting loss of flexibility and freedom of movement to AMISOM.

- An offensive against Jalalaqsi is reportedly in its final stages of preparation, with forces assembling in Jowhar and Bulo Burto, aiming to strike the town within the next few months.
- Al-Shabaab activity in the Central region is limited to asymmetric strikes in support of existing blockades and against Government held towns.



Incident Map 3, Central Region

1. **Qalimow.** 07.07 Gunmen assassinate 3 SNA soldiers.
2. **Cabudwaq.** 08.07 Local Government official assassinated by gunmen from rival clan.
3. **Deefow.** 09.07 Fighting between rival clans 10 killed 15 injured.
4. **Guri-Ceel.** 09.07 Security forces seize car carrying explosives. 3 arrested.
5. **Meyraaley.** 10.07 Al-Shabaab seizes crew of Kenyan owned cargo ship that became stranded due to technical difficulties.
6. **Jowhar.** 12.07 EOD disposes of large IED on main road.
7. **Jowhar.** 13.07 Government Official survives VBIED assassination attempt.



Forecast Map 2, Central Region

SOUTHERN REGION


Security Analysis

Fighting in the Southern region was dominated by fighting in both the north of the region and the south. This week saw Al-Shabaab resurgent across the southern region with numerous strikes on SNA and AMISOM positions.

In the face of a resurgent Al-Shabaab, AMISOM attempted to use airstrikes to destroy Al-Shabaab positions in the Gedo and Lower Juba regions, though as before these had little effect and did nothing to hamper Al-Shabaab's operations.

In the north of the region, Bay and Bakool, AMISOM and the SNA resumed offensive operations striking against Al-Shabaab held towns. By the end of the week Al-Shabaab had lost its stronghold of Labaatan Jirow. Although given that Al-Shabaab's campaign revolves around flexibility the loss of towns is less of a blow than it once was.

We saw a seeming break in the clan fighting in the Lower Shabelle region between the Biyomaal Dir and the Abgaal Hawiye. All indications are that both sides are being kept separated by AMISOM and Digil Mirifle units of the SNA. If these peacekeeping forces are withdrawn it is likely that fighting will resume, but for now at least things remain less overtly tense.



Incident Map 4, Southern Region

1. **Ceel Saliini.** 07.07 Al-Shabaab attacks SNA base.
2. **Kismayo.** 07.07 Clashes between IJA and rival militia.
3. **Baidoa.** 07.07 Security forces conduct search and arrest operations. 20 detained.
4. **Janaale.** 08.07 Al-Shabaab attacks SNA base.
5. **Busbusc.** 09.07 AMISOM attacks Al-Shabaab base.
6. **Afgooye.** 10.07 Al-Shabaab assassinate SNA soldier.
7. **Wanla Weyn.** 10.07 Al-Shabaab attack SNA base.
8. **Qansax Dheere.** 11.07 Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM base.
9. **Wanla Weyn.** 11.07 Security forces conduct sweep operation, 36 suspects detained.
10. **Kismayo.** 12.07 Al-Shabaab IED attack on IJA militia convoy.
11. **Kismayo.** 12.07 Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM base.
12. **Afmadow.** 12.07 Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM base.
13. **Baidoa.** 12.07 Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM base.
14. **Dhobley.** 12.07 KDF conducts airstrikes on suspected Al-Shabaab positions.
15. **Baraawe.** 12.07 Al-Shabaab executes 2 suspected spies.
16. **Belet Xaawo.** 12.07 KDF closes border with Somalia citing security concerns.
17. **Labaatan Jirow.** 12.07 SNA and AMISOM capture town following Al-Shabaab withdrawal.
18. **Saydheelo.** 12.07 SNA and AMISOM capture town following Al-Shabaab withdrawal.
19. **Faafax Dhuun.** 12.07 KDF conducts airstrikes on suspected Al-Shabaab positions.
20. **Ceel Adde.** 12.07 KDF conducts airstrikes on suspected Al-Shabaab positions.
21. **Afgooye.** 13.07 Al-Shabaab assassinates SNP officer.
22. **Afgooye.** 13.07 Al-Shabaab carries out IED attack on SNA patrol.
23. **Reys Qode.** 13.07 Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM base.


Security Forecast

There is no sign that fighting in the Southern Region will finish in the near future. There are several key threats at present;

- Continued presence of Al-Shabaab;
- Tensions between rival clans in Lower Shabelle;
- Tensions over the new Federal states.

In recent weeks tensions between Clans and rival Federal States have led to fighting across the southern region. While Al-Shabaab is the most significant short term threat, long term clan tensions eclipse the threat of Al-Shabaab.

With increased clan tensions the requirement for AMISOM to conduct peace keeping duties and keep warring clans separated is a risk to the ongoing offensive to liberate Somalia from Al-Shabaab; it sucks troops away from leading offensives, but without doing so leaves AMISOM with unsecure supply lines. Additionally the continuing political impasse over the Federalism issue- in itself also clan linked, though less overtly violent- has the potential to lead to additional clan related violence in areas that have thus far seen mainly fighting against Al-Shabaab.



At the current time the campaign to drive Al-Shabaab out of the Southern Region has stalled in the face of environmental and logistical concerns, which are exacerbated by their inability to dominate rural areas. In the Southern Region are several key Al-Shabaab strongholds which AMISOM needs to liberate. Identified as AMISOM targets are;

- **Jilib** is now home to an Al-Shabaab stronghold and command and control structure.
 - AMISOM is likely to move on Jilib only when Diinsoor; Baardheere or Saakow are cleared.
- **Diinsoor** is another Al-Shabaab stronghold and hosts key logistics facilities.
 - AMISOM forces from Qansax Dheere may be used to threaten the city, depending on supply routes.
- **Baardheere** continues to be threatened by AMISOM forces in Buurdhuubo to the north and Faafux Dhuun to the west. However, no effort has been made to seize the town.
- **Baraawe** is the last port in the Southern region under Al-Shabaab control and also provides a home to training and logistics facilities.
 - AMISOM forces in Qoryooley and Marka are positioned to strike towards Baraawe, but are impeded by Al-Shabaab defensive operations in Lower Shabelle.
 - Should Diinsoor fall it would be possible for AMISOM to advance on Baraawe from the north.
- **Kurtunwaarey** east of Qoryooley is another growing Al-Shabaab stronghold. Facilities in the town have been used to support attacks within Lower Shabelle and prepare operations to strike Mogadishu.
 - The expected AMISOM offensive towards Baraawe will in all likelihood take Kurtunwaarey first in order to ensure flank security.

Al-Shabaab on the other hand is also continuing to conduct operations in the Southern Region, though these tend to be small scale local operations as opposed to large offensives.

The main targets for Al-Shabaab offensive activity, aside from continuing strikes in those areas recently liberated by AMISOM are;

- **Kismayo** with Al-Shabaab forces drawn from the Amniyat in place and conducting strikes against the IJA.
- **Baidoa** with strong Al-Shabaab positions in Abal; Totiyas and on a line stretching from Jilibey to Labaatan Jirow.
 - Al-Shabaab forces are also positioned in and around Idale and Goof-Gaduud and are positioned to interdict movement of vehicles to and from Baidoa.

Operations in and around other Al-Shabaab strongholds, including Jilib; Bu'aale and Jamaame in Middle Juba and Kurtunwaarey in Lower Shabelle are to be expected to counter AMISOM offensive operations.

MOGADISHU

Security Analysis

This week continued the pattern of bloody violence that started last week with Al-Shabaab's Ramadan offensive. By the end of the week at least 37 had been killed.

The Governments assertions that it had improved security were again demonstrated to be empty promises. In an audacious move Al-Shabaab struck the Villa Somalia for the 2nd time this year. Using a combination of tactics Al-Shabaab gunmen entered the building and even made it to the Prime Minister's Office. The attack is illustrative of the range of abilities within Al-Shabaab; access to the compound was made by an Al-Shabaab agent on the staff of the Villa Somalia escorting in a VBIED. Bypassing 2 checkpoints, the VBIED was used to destroy a 3rd checkpoint, at least 8 Al-Shabaab gunmen then entered the compound and attacked at key locations, Prime Minister Ahmed who was in the Villa Somalia at the time of the attack was rushed to safety by security guards, prior to a counter attack by AMISOM and Alfa Group. At the end of the attack 15 lay dead, including 5 Al-Shabaab attackers, in a final insult it seems as if several Al-Shabaab members escaped.

The rest of the week saw a mix of everything we have come to expect from Al-Shabaab, with assassinations, IED attacks and even pitched assaults on security forces.

The assassination campaign was particularly telling for a 2nd week. Last week we saw 5 Traffic Policemen die, resulting in the absence of the Traffic Police. This week saw government officials and community workers the preferred targets with 7 officials being killed, if all attacks had been successful the death toll would have been higher- several officials narrowly survived attempts on their life.

Unsurprisingly the use of IEDs has been a key element of Al-Shabaab activity this week, with IEDs used in assassination attempts on Government Officials and the VBIED used to force entry into the Villa Somalia.

Security Forecast

The 1st week of the Ramadan offensive has seen significant numbers of attacks. While Al-Shabaab cannot take the city as it stands, the success of the Ramadan offensive undermines the Federal Governments assertions that they will defeat Al-Shabaab.

It is notable that attacks have occurred throughout Mogadishu this week and we expect this to continue, Al-Shabaab has significant presence and operates openly in Daynile; Heliwa and Yaaqshiid.

In the weeks ahead continued activity throughout Mogadishu is to be expected, especially within the central districts that are home to government facilities.



Incident Map 5, Mogadishu

1. **Heliwa.** 07.07 Al-Shabaab attacks SNA checkpoint. 2 killed.
2. **Hawl Wadaag.** 07.07 Gunmen assassinate businessman.
3. **Karaan.** 07.07 Al-Shabaab attacks SNA base. 3 killed 3 injured.
4. **Wadajir.** 08.07 Al-Shabaab assassinates former MP.
5. **Hawl Wadaag.** 08.07 Al-Shabaab assassinates security official and bodyguard.
6. **Boondheere.** 08.07 Al-Shabaab attacks Villa Somalia. 15 killed
7. **Wardhiigleey.** 08.07 Gunmen assassinate employee of Government run Radio Mogadishu.
8. **Heliwa.** 08.07 Unknown gunmen assassinate civilian.
9. **Wardhiigleey.** 08.07 Al-Shabaab assassinates NISA officer.
10. **Xamarweyne.** 08.07 Maka al-Murakama closed due to security searches.
11. **Hodan.** 08.07 Gunmen assassinate former ICU Official.
12. **Dharkenley.** 09.07 Al-Shabaab assassinates Government Lawyer.
13. **Yaaqshiid.** 09.07 Al-Shabaab assassinates Government Official.
14. **Heliwa.** 10.07 Unknown gunmen assassinate civilian.
15. **Shibis.** 10.07 Government Official survives VBIED assassination attempt. 3 injured.
16. **Dharkenley.** 11.07 MP survives Al-Shabaab assassination attempt. Bodyguard killed.
17. **Shibis.** 11.07 SNA troops kill community worker.
18. **Xamarweyne.** 12.07 Security sweep 350+ detained.
19. **Daynile.** 12.07 Al-Shabaab assassinates SNA soldier.
20. **Heliwa.** 12.07 Unknown gunmen assassinate local official.
21. **Hawl Wadaag.** 13.07 Al-Shabbaab assassinates SNA soldier.
22. **Yaaqshiid.** 13.07 Gunmen assassinate civilian.



Forecast Map 4, Mogadishu

AL-SHABAAB TACTICS AND THREAT GUIDANCE

Al-Shabaab Inside Somalia

Al-Shabaab has in the last few months demonstrated a tactical maturity and sophistication that was previously missing.

In the face of overwhelming AMISOM forces, Al-Shabaab has given up territory and traded space for time. Though they have not completely run away from areas liberated by AMISOM.

It is clear Al-Shabaab planned to withdraw from these areas and spent time preparing a stay behind presence with undercover fighters and pre-planted IEDs. Their tactical sophistication reached its peak in Qoryooley where they flooded farming areas around the city in order to trap AMISOM within the city and limit their movement out.

Al-Shabaab are working to limit the supplies entering towns recently liberated, they have imposed several blockades to supplies forcing AMISOM and the SNA to either give up supplies to support civilians or risk losing the hearts and minds campaign.

Al-Shabaab Outside Somalia

Al-Shabaab has repeatedly demonstrated its ability and resolve to look outside Somalia and given the success of their attacks outside Somalia in recent weeks this trend will continue.

This week saw Al-Shabaab continue its wave of attacks in Kenya, with further attacks in Lamu County, destroying seizing a Kenyan Wildlife Service and a Police Reserve Camp. Both attacks saw Al-Shabaab fighters seize weapons, supplies and vehicles to facilitate further attacks.

The security threat to Kenya is roving so significant that the Kenyan Government has started to close border crossings and has stepped up forces on its border with Somalia.

There is known to be a significant Al-Shabaab presence in countries neighbouring Somalia, with reports of threat in Uganda of attacks on high profile targets, including major airports.

There is also emerging chatter that Amniyat teams are being prepared to target Western nationals throughout East Africa with further strikes in Djibouti being a priority.

THREAT FORECAST AND GUIDANCE

There remains a specific threat against foreign nationals and organisations operating inside Somalia from both criminal and terrorist forces. Somalia remains at high risk of violence in the vicinity of major population centres and roads. Specifically;

- Mogadishu- at present with the Ramadan offensive underway, travel to Mogadishu should be considered very high risk. If travel is necessary movement should be minimised and escorted by appropriate security personnel;
- Northern Region-
 - Caution is advised in the vicinity of Gaalkacyo; Garowe; Bossaso and Hargeysa;
- Central Region-
 - Caution is advised in the vicinity of Belet Weyne and Jowhar.
 - Avoid all travel to Ceel Buur; Bulo Burto and Jalalaqsi;
- Southern Region-
 - Caution is advised in the vicinity of Baidoa; Kismayo and other population centres;
 - Avoid all travel to cities under Al-Shabaab control, as well as Waajid; Belet Xaawo; Marka and Afgooye.

We would also advise all organisations operating in Somalia to exercise the highest levels of security.

- All facilities should be hardened to resist terrorist attack, with perimeter security and safe areas in place, measures should also include an adequate guard force and hardening of the buildings structure to resist explosive attacks.
- Movement in country should be limited to necessary travel only and should be risk assessed to ensure it is necessary. Movement where possible should be with armed protection and in adequately protected vehicles.
- If possible movement by air is considered preferable to road movements;
- Meetings should be conducted in secure facilities only and never in places accessible to the public. Al-Shabaab has demonstrated its ability to conduct strikes targeted at security and international personnel in public areas.
- In the wake of a recent Al-Shabaab threat we would also recommend international organisations to apply these same security measures to local staff.

While Al-Shabaab is the highest profile threat, it should also be remembered that even in areas outside of Al-Shabaab's control, the threat of clan related violence as well as criminal activity should not be underestimated.

The lack of government control over large swathes of Somalia allows criminal gangs free reign. Criminal activity ranges from illegal tolls on roads to the kidnap of staff. Crime is also perpetrated by unpaid SNA and SNP personnel, including running illegal checkpoints; robbery and kidnapping.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Security Leadership and Political Appointments

The audacious attack on the Villa Somalia on 08.07 has led to a number of political changes of note, both immediate changes and illustrative of long term trends in Somali politics.

In the short term the attack motivated the federal government to make changes in the leadership of the security forces. In the aftermath the prime minister fired the head of the SNP and NISA, he also finalised the appointment of Ahmed Khalif Erag as national security minister- an appointment that was initially discussed at the start of June following the firing of Minister Guled, but delayed due to political reasons.

Long term the post attack appointments revealed a more worrying trend that has been mentioned before, inasmuch that the government seems to appointment persons to senior governmental roles with less concern for their experience and suitability for the post and more concern for the clan lineage or political connections.

If we look for example at the 3 security appointments made this week, we have 3 candidates whose experience either does not readily lend itself to leading security agencies or whose prior experience in similar roles is less than impressive.

The new national security minister, Khalif Erag, was formerly the head of the NISA in Mogadishu. In this role he was implicated in a number of atrocities before being fired for not effectively securing Mogadishu. At the time of his sacking, the level and sophistication of attacks in the city was lower than we seen in the last 6 months, with repeated strikes on the parliament, Villa Somalia and a campaign of assassinations of political leaders and government officials. Even his appointment to lead the NISA in Mogadishu was questionable as prior to this he had been a bodyguard to 2 Ministers and then worked for an NGO as a driver before being selected by the then Head of the NISA Mohamed Sheikh Mohamed- now the Minister of Defence- to lead the NISA in Mogadishu.

The new head of the NISA- Abdullahi Mohamed Ali "Sanbaloolshe"- was prior to his appointment, Somalia's ambassador to the UK. He was previously National Security Minister in the Sheikh Sharif Transitional Federal Government, before being selected as Ambassador.

The new head of the Somali National Police Mohamed Sheikh Hassan Ismail- is based on his career to date- an even more unusual choice. While he has held a number of security and police roles, the fact that he has been convicted of crimes against humanity is a questionable pedigree for any one leading a National Police Force.

So we have 3 new leaders in the security apparatus who are either inexperienced or who have been removed from security leadership roles before. One could be forgiven for wondering what insight and ability these 3 bring to their new roles. Unfortunately there is no positive answer, all 3 have been- it appears- picked for clan lineage and due to political reasons as opposed to real talent. It is notable that at least 2 were well connected to the Sheikh Sharif Transitional Federal Government.

The Hawiye Clan certainly feels that there is a clan aspect to this and protested the appointment of Mohamed Sheikh Hassan Ismail as the Head of the SNP as he is from the same clan as the Prime Minister. It seems a little ironic that the Hawiye protest the appointment due to clan reasons, as opposed to any concern that the new Head of the SNP has been convicted of crimes against humanity, but this is Somalia.

However, it is worth pointing out that the appointment of 3 new leaders seems to be ill considered at this time. The 3 appointees could be the most experienced candidates ever, yet their ability to affect real change in the security environment is limited.

MP Salaad Ali Jeele spoke this week about the elephant in the room and publicly stated that there are many Al-Shabaab agents within the Federal Government and it's supporting Ministries. We only need to look at the attack on the Villa Somalia for evidence of this. The attack was facilitated by an Al-Shabaab agent in place, officially working for Hormud Telecom, the agent "Hassan" had sufficient access to the Villa Somalia to aid in getting a VBIED through 2 checkpoints. It is apparent from a publicized interview that "Hassan" also facilitated other attacks, including the previous assault on the Villa Somalia. Despite his obvious connections to Al-Shabaab- his brother is a current member and 2 other brothers died fighting for Al-Shabaab- "Hassan" was employed in a role that allowed him access to the highest levels of government and sensitive facilities. In most countries such access only comes after an extensive background investigation- which would have raised his Al-Shabaab links- but in Somalia "Hassan" was approved for the role on the basis of his clan, Abgaal Hawiye- same as several powerful political leaders.

Indeed if we look at mid-level security leaders there are links to Al-Shabaab, both the Head and Deputy Head of NISA in Mogadishu were- as we have reported before- members of the ICU and close to several ICU- now Al-Shabaab- leaders.

It is questionable where the loyalty of a number of influential figures in the security apparatus lies. If we go beyond Al-Shabaab and also look at clan rivalry many of the most influential leaders in the security services identify themselves by clan lineage as opposed to nationality.

The replacement of the Heads of the SNP and NISA also demonstrates another worrying trend in the Federal Government, that of attempting to identify and remove scapegoats as opposed to effecting real change. While leaders must bear responsibility for their subordinates conduct and failures, too often the Federal Government has sought to replace leaders after every mishap. By seeking to make an individual the scapegoat for failure, as opposed to the Federal Government taking responsibility and working as a group to resolve issues, the Federal Government fails to learn from its mistakes as a body. Ultimately replacing the Heads of the SNP and NISA- following on the heels of the sacking of the Head of the SNA- leaves the security services without any experienced leaders. Equally by firing these individuals the Federal Government can absolve itself, as a group, of any culpability in the failure to secure the nation.

Indeed as we have mentioned above it is difficult to see how the replacement of 2 senior leadership roles can possibly affect any real change until appropriate strategies are pursued across Somalia. Yet as PM Ahmed stated last week the Federal Government actually lacks a plan or strategy to defeat Al-Shabaab. There is a distinct lack of coordination and cooperation between government institutions and without this- especially at grassroots level- there will be no progress in bringing security to Somalia.

Justice

This week saw the Federal Government Cabinet approve the Terrorism Bill; this in theory brings a legal means to prosecute Al-Shabaab suspects. The Bill was submitted to the Parliament; however Parliament actually rejected the bill and sent it back to the Cabinet for amendments.

The bill itself could be described as draconian and punishes not just those convicted of terrorism, but those who support it; the mandatory sentence for persons convicted of terrorism is death. The Parliament did not flinch at the mandatory death penalty- and based on the fact they are targets this is quite understandable- they however suggested amendments to the punishments for those accused of supporting terrorism.

The submitted draft of the law stated that someone convicted of terrorism would have their property confiscated. The concern expressed by the Parliament was that officials could accuse a person of terrorism and confiscate their property and that given the levels of corruption prevalent in Somali society and particularly the security services false allegations of terrorism could be levelled. Based on the number of stories of corruption and cases being held in courts relating to corruption these seem legitimate concerns and that the Parliament expressed them is a positive indication that they are working to safeguard justice. On the other hand it is also an indictment of the state of the security services in that corruption is expected and is not an isolated event.

The other concern about the Terrorism Bill is that it seems a pointless exercise, currently Al-Shabaab suspects are prosecuted by military courts and that situation is not likely to change. The Chief Justice of Somalia has indicated that due to security risks the criminal court system will not change its stance and deal with terrorism cases anytime soon. As he indicated there is no security at most courts and AMISOM is not mandated to protect court buildings. Until such time as there are measures in place to safeguard court buildings and the lives of judges there is no likelihood that terrorism cases will be removed from the military courts. So if the military courts will continue prosecuting Al-Shabaab suspects and will do so under military justice, as they are doing now, it seems a rather pointless law. Indeed while Parliament and the Federal Government devote their time to this there are of course a number of other laws and legal issues that still need resolving.

POLITICAL FORECAST

Parliament and the Federal Government

At present the crisis over the impeachment of the President seems to have gone quiet, President Hassan addressed Parliament on 16.06 and appealed for Parliament to work with the Government and in a surprise move admitted the Government had made mistakes. Whether this will prove a successful move remains to be seen, it is likely that the reconciliation between the SW3 and SW6 will see President Hassan gain support from the Digil-Mirifle and Biyomaal Dir MPs, while equally costing him some Hawiye support. Whether this changes the numbers of MPs opposing him and expressing a lack of confidence remains to be seen.

While there is no overt change, that the Constitutional Review Committee was approved by a large margin might be seen as progress- equally it could be a sign that enough MPs realise how deeply flawed the Constitution is and that real change is needed urgently.

Federalism and Clans

Federalism and relations between clans look to be a source of further tensions ahead. In recent weeks we have seen indications that the growth of Federalism is being subverted by clan interests and will lead to further clan linked violence.

The reconciliation deal between South-West 3 and South-West 6 is a development in the right direction and consolidating support behind the South-West 3 banner solves a number of problems. But it also creates problems and despite the Federal Government's support for South-West 3 it remains to be seen how much value this support will have, especially in Lower Shabelle. In addition we could see an increase in tensions in the Independent Juba Administration area as those who believed they part of South-West 6 and were waiting for rescue from Madobe's supporters now realise they have been abandoned to the Independent Juba Administration's control.

The proposed central region comprising Galmudug and Himan and Heeb continues, with Ahlu Sunna meeting administration representatives to ensure cooperation from all sides.

The tensions between Somaliland and Puntland will, we predict, remain tense, although armed conflict is unlikely, other than local skirmishes, provided Somaliland acts to secure its side of the disputed borders from Al-Shabaab. While both sides believe there is casus belli, open conflict will benefit neither side and would indeed set back the progress Somaliland and Puntland have made.

For further information on our services please do not hesitate to discuss

Email; Alasdair@hermes-associates.org

Hermes Associates

